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Administrative Law-Evidence-Hearsay and the Right of
Confrontation in Administrative Hearings
The United States Court of Claims in Peters v. United States1
recently rendered an opinion that significantly affects the character of
administrative evidence and the right of cross-examination in a federal
hearing. If the decision is widely accepted, the result will be that hearsay
evidence can form the sole basis of an administrative adjudication, and
the right of cross-examination will be reduced, at most, to a limited privi-
lege.
Sergeant Peters was a placement assistant in the United States Air
Force with the responsibility for placing applicants in the Air Force
Reserve program. Upon notification that he was being removed for accept-
ing bribes for preferential placements, Peters appealed to the Civil Service
Commission, an administrative right available to him as a career airman.2
Prior to the hearing, the Commission made available to Peters the affi-
davits of the four persons charging him with bribery and certain other
correspondence between the Air Force and the accusers. Several weeks
before the hearing Peters' counsel requested that the Air Force produce
the four affiants at the hearing, but the Air Force refused because it
had no jurisdiction over these men except on training weekends.
At the hearing the Government introduced the four apparent affi-
davits' of the four declarants over Peters' objection and also produced two
officers as witnesses. One had taken the four statements, and the other had
talked to three of the men. Both corroborated the taking of the statements
2408 F.2d 719 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
2 Veterans' Preference Act § 14, 5 U.S.C. § 863 (1964). This act provides such
special procedural protections for veterans as thirty days advance notice of proposed
discharge, information about the reasons for proposed discharge, a reasonable time
for answering charges, and the right to appeal to the full Civil Service Commission.
'There is some question whether these four typed statements were actually
affidavits in the formal sense. The officer before whom the statements were taken
testified that because his stenographer was having difficulty, he supplemented her
work with his own notes. The two products were later typed together as the
formal statements made by the four declarants. 408 F.2d at 722. This procedure
raises some doubt as to the accuracy of the statements. The affidavits were written
in the third person rather than in the usual first person form, bore no jurat or
seal, and were not signed by anyone authorized to administer an oath.
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contained in the affidavits. These corroborated statements were the full
extent of the Government's evidence presented to the Commission. Peters
himself testified as to his innocence and directly contradicted the Govern-
ment's evidence. On the basis of the four corroborated affidavits, the
Commission upheld the Government's action in removing Peters. Alleging
that his procedural rights had been violated and that the Commission's
decision was contrary to law,4 Peters brought an action for back pay.
The Court of Claims in a four-to-one decision affirmed the Com-
mission's actions in dismissing Peters. The court held that because the
affidavits were corroborated and were declarations against interest, they
were reliable, probative, and substantial evidence upon which the decision
could rest.' The court also held that Peters' procedural rights in regard to
cross-examination of the four declarants had not been violated because the
burden was upon him to produce them for cross-examination." Each of
these determinations appears to be contrary to precedent and raises serious
questions regarding the sufficiency of evidence and the right to confront
accusers before a federal administrative agency.
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), decisions of federal
agencies must be based upon reliable, probative, and substantial evidence ;7
however, rules of evidence need not be strictly followed.' It has been con-
sistently recognized that the hearsay rule is not applicable to bar the
introduction of statements or testimony before a federal agency.9 Even
with this liberal policy of admission of evidence, a safeguard against arbi-
trary and capricious decisions was established by the substantial-evidence
test.
This test was formulated by the United States Supreme Court over
thirty years ago, before the passage of the APA, in Consolidated Edison
Co. v. NLRB.1 The Court held that a federal administrative agency must
base its decisions on substantial evidence and said: "Substantial evidence




75 U.S.C. §556(d) (1968).
'See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 77 2.30 5 (c) (4) (1969) (Civil Service Commission); 20
C.F.R. §404.928 (1969) (Health, Education and Welfare).
0 Cohen v. Perales, 412 F.2d 44, 51 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Rocker v. Celebrezze, 358
F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1966); Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676,
690-91 (9th Cir. 1949).
1o305 U.S. 197 (1938).
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able mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." The Court
then proceeded to state that "mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does
not constitute substantial evidence."' 2 The pre-APA substantial-evidence
test of Consolidated Edison was cited by the Court with approval and
without modification in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,'8 a post-APA
case, and clearly remains the law under the APA. In addition, numerous
lower courts, including the Court of Claims, have cited the statement
from Consolidated Edison as controlling on the question of hearsay as
substantial evidence.' Clearly, then, mere uncorroborated hearsay does
not constitute substantial evidence under the APA.
There is authority, however, for the proposition that hearsay may be
relevant and have probative value in an administrative finding.' A close
examination of the major cases in which hearsay evidence was deemed
to be relevant reveals that the decisions were based on something more
than hearsay alone; in each case there was, in addition to the hearsay evi-
dence, direct and substantial evidence upon which the decisions were ulti-
mately rested.' Aside from Peters, the correct and accepted rule has been
that while uncorroborated hearsay may be admitted into evidence, the
ultimate decision must be supported by other legal and substantial evi-
dence.
The Court of Claims in Peters, though citing the substantial-evidence
test of Consolidated Edison with approval, attached little significance to
the Supreme Court's statement that "uncorroborated hearsay or rumor
does not constitute substantial evidence."'' The Court of Claims thought
that this statement was "obviously dictum,"' s but overlooked the extent
11 Id. at 229.12Id. at 230.
'*340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951).
NLRB v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 202 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1953);
Montana Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 185 F.2d 491, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ;
Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 690 (9th Cir. 1949); United
States v. Krumsiek, 111 F.2d 74, 78 (1st Cir. 1940); Hill v. Fleming, 169 F.
Supp. 240, 245 (W.D. Pa. 1958); Conn v. United States, 376 F.2d 878, 883 (Ct.
Cl. 1967); Camero v. United States, 345 F.2d 798, 800 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
" Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1949); Morelli v.
United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 848 (1966).
"8Montana Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 185 F.2d 491 (D.C. Cir.
1950); Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1949); Hill v.
Fleming, 169 F. Supp. 240 (W.D. Pa. 1958); Morelli v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl.
848 (1966) ; Camero v. United States, 345 F.2d 798 (Ct. Cl. 1965). But see United
States v. Costello, 221 F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1955) (indictment based solely upon
hearsay sustained).
17 305 U.S. at 230.
18408 F.2d at 723.
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to which the principle has been adopted in the cases'" after Consolidated
Edison.
Corroboration by the Government's witnesses of the accuracy of the
statements contained in the four affidavits did not add any probative value
to the evidence in Peters, for the corroboration was itself hearsay.20
Thus the court in effect allowed hearsay upon hearsay-pyramided hearsay
-which is no more reliable than single hearsay to sustain a decision.2 '
Judge Skelton in an able and revealing dissent in Peters aptly described
what results from such corroboration: "Adding hearsay to hearsay is like
adding zero to zero which still equals zero."22
In a further attempt to justify the Commission's decision based solely
upon the four affidavits, the Court of Claims held that they contained
declarations against interest because the declarants could be subjected to
criminal liability for the crimes alleged.2" By applying this label to the
statements, the court was able to satisfy itself that an exception to the
hearsay rule formed the basis of the Commission's decision; declarations
against interest are recognized as possessing trustworthiness and pro-
bative value because the declarant would not intentionally make a statement
against his interest unless it was true.' The court reasoned that since
the hearsay had probative and reliable value, a decision resting upon it
could be said to be based upon substantial evidence.
This reasoning significantly diluted the substantial-evidence test. Even
if the declarations could be labeled as exceptions to the hearsay rule, the
statements contained in the affidavits were still hearsay. They could be
introduced and accorded some weight in an administrative hearing, but they
were in fact the only evidence used to sustain the decision.
Moreover, it is doubtful that these statements against penal interest
were traditional hearsay exceptions under federal law.23 And there is doubt
"o See note 14 supra.2 See Neal v. United States, 22 F.2d 52, 55 (4th Cir. 1927) ; Royal Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 254 F. 805, 809 (4th Cir. 1918).
91 See United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863, 869 (2d Cir. 1948). But see
2 K. DAVIs, ADmINIsTRATIvE LAW TREATISE §§ 14.10-.12 (1958).
2 408 F.2d at 738 (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 724.2 'C. McCoR ICx, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 253 (1954).
'"In Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913), the Supreme Court de-
clared that a statement against penml interest was not within the exception to the
hearsay rule. The holding in Donnelly is the overwhelming majority rule today. 5
J. WIG MOE, EVIDENCE § 1476 (3d ed. 1940). A minority of jurisdictions reject
the rule in Donnelly and hold that a statement against penal interest is within
the exception. See, e.g., People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 389 P.2d 377, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 841 (1964); Brady v. State, 226 Md. 422, 174 A.2d 167 (1961); Sutter v.
19701
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that these statements were actually against penal interest, for as the dissent
in Peters pointed out,28 none of these affiants was ever punished in any way.
One can infer that the Government promised immunity in return for the
affiants' signing the statements. Thus the reliability and probative value
of these statements are diminished even further, and they should be entitled
to no more consideration than any other hearsay.
The final aspect of Peters that is significant is the Court of Claims'
holding with regard to the right to confrontation at an administrative
hearing. In denying Peters' contention that his procedural right of cross-
examination had been violated, the court held that the initial burden of
producing the opposing witnesses was upon Peters. The court said that
because he failed to attempt to procure their attendance at the hearing,
it was his own inaction that prevented his opportunity to confront."
Administrative discharge of civilian employees and career servicemen
without the safeguard of the right to confrontation has become an in-
creasing concern. Attack under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment has been futile because of the established doctrine that an
individual has no constitutional right to governmental employment29 or
military status." A constitutional right of confrontation in deportation
hearings has been found,31 but confrontation has not been accorded the
status of a right in ordinary administrative hearings. It is particularly un-
Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284 (1945); Blocker v. State, 55 Tex. Crim.
30, 114 S.W. 814 (1908); Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843
(1923). It should also be noted that those jurisdictions recognizing statements
against penal interest as a proper exception to the hearsay rule do so only to
exculpate the accused. In Peters the declarations were used to incriminate the
accused. But see State v. Alcorn, 7 Idaho 599, 64 P. 1014 (1901) ; State v. Voges,
197 Minn. 85, 90, 266 N.W. 265, 267 (1936) (dissenting opinion).
28 408 F.2d at 733 (dissenting opinion).
2 Id. at 725.
28 See Dougherty & Lynch, The Administrative Discharge: Military Justice?,
33 Gzo. WAsr. L. REv. 498 (1964); Susskind, Military Administrative Discharge
Boards: The Right to Confrontation and Cross-Examination, 44 Micr. ST. B.f.
25 (1965); Note, Confrontation and Cross-Examination in Hearings for the
Administrative Separation of Military Officers, 20 STAN. L. REv. 360 (1968); 12
Am. U.L. REv. 205 (1963).2 See, e.g., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
"0See, e.g., Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 304 (1911); Beard v. Stahr,
200 F. Supp. 766 (D.D.C. 1961). However, there is authority for the proposition
that lack of a substantive due-process right should not defeat the right to procedural
due process. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction
in Constitutional Law, 81 HIv. L. REV. 1439, 1452 (1968).
"1 Maltez v. Nagle, 27 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1928); Ex parte Radivoeff, 278 F.
227 (D.C. Mont. 1922).
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fortunate that safeguards have not been extended to hearings on discharge
of governmental employees and servicemen, for many times these proceed-
ings are almost criminal in nature and result in unemployment and loss of
reputation. While the courts have departed from the traditional reluctance
to inquire into an agency's action in cases in which the outcome "stig-
matizes" the governmental employee 2 or serviceman,' these inquiries have
been restricted almost entirely to interpretation of the statutory procedural
rights provided."4 An exception is some dictum in the case of Greene v.
McElroy.5
In Greene an employee of a private manufacturer was discharged solely
as a result of revocation by the Department of Defense of his clearance
to handle classified information.8 Greene was provided a hearing, but
was denied the opportunity to confront witnesses whose statements were
adverse to his interests.. The Supreme Court reversed the revocation
of Greene's clearance on the basis that neither Congress nor the President
had authorized such a procedure. In significant dictum, Chief Justice
Warren, writing for the majority, stated that the Court has adamantly
protected the right of confrontation with one's accusers "not only in crim-
inal cases ... but also in cases where administrative and regulatory action
was under scrutiny."' s Such language indicates that the Court is cognizant
that due process is a necessity if the administrative action threatens serious
injury to the individual. 9
But in Williams v. Zuckert" the Court again avoided squarely facing
the constitutional issue of the right to confrontation. Williams was dis-
charged on the basis of three affidavits admitted at an administrative hear-
ing. At the hearing Williams requested for the first time the appearance
of the affiants for cross-examination. Williams had made no prior attempt
" See Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 555 (1956); Wieman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952); cf. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 333
(1955).
"8Bland v. Connelly, 293 F.2d 852, 858-59 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Covington v.
Schwartz, 230 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
"See, e.g., Williams v. Zuckert, 371 U.S. 531 (1963), noted in 12 AM. U.L.
REV. 205 (1963) ; Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
S360 U.S. 474 (1959).
00 Id. at 475.
87 Id. at 479.
s Id. at 497.
"See 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATIsE § 7.05, at 162 (Supp.
1965).
"0 371 U.S. 531 (1963). The question whether hearsay constitutes substantial
evidence was not raised.
1970]
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to arrange privately for their appearances, and the Supreme Court dis-
missed certiorari on the basis that the then applicable Commission's regu-
lation41 required that he nust make his own arrangements for the presence
of witnesses by at least assuming the initial burden of attempting to pro-
duce them. By not assuming this burden, Williams lost his right to
confrontation. justices Black and Douglas, dissenting, reached the consti-
tutional issue:
[Pletitioner has been branded with a stigma and discharged on the
strength of three affidavits. Though he asked that these affiants be
produced at his hearing, none was called to confront him. The Court
says that petitioner's request came too late to conform with the
applicable regulation. Due process dictates a different result. We have
heretofore analogized these administrative proceedings that cast the
citizen into the outer darkness to proceedings that "involve the im-
position of criminal sanctions"; and we have looked to "deeply rooted"
principles of criminal law for guidance in construing regulations of
this character .... The requirements of due process provided by the
Fifth Amendment should protect him . . .by giving him the same
right to confront his accusers as he would have in a criminal trial.42
In Hanifan v. United States43 the Court of Claims modified somewhat
this initial burden of production of witnesses by the accused in admin-
istrative hearings. The petitioner in Hanifan had made numerous re-
quests over a period of several months prior to the hearing for the
production as witnesses of employees of the Internal Revenue Service.
Hanifan, however, did not attempt to arrange privately for their attendance.
The court held that Hanifan was excused for his failure to attempt to
arrange privately for their appearance because the conclusion was in-
escapable that the witnesses would not have accepted his invitation if
tendered.4
It can be argued that Peters involved a situation in which the applica-
tion of the Hanifan principle would have been appropriate to overcome the
lack of greater initiative on Peters' behalf. Because the affiants may have
been granted immunity, their presence would have been undesirable to the
" 20 Fed. Reg. 2699 (1955), provided: "The Commission is not authorized to
subpoena witnesses. The employee and his designated representative, and the
employing agency must make their own arrangements for the appearance of wit-
nesses."
1371 U.S. at 533-34 (dissenting opinion) (footnotes omitted).




Government; it appears unlikely that an invitation from Peters to appear
at the hearing would have been accepted.
In Peters, the Court of Claims relied entirely upon Williams and
analogized the regulations45 involved in each case. The court concluded
that since Peters had not taken the initiative in securing the witnesses' at-
tendance, he was estopped from claiming a denial of the right to confronta-
tion. The analogy between the regulation involved in Peters and the one
involved in Williams is clear, but the Court of Claims failed to realize
that the cases are easily distinguishable. In the latter, the Supreme Court
placed great reliance upon the fact that Williams' first request for the
appearance of the witnesses came at the hearing;46 however, in Peters the
plaintiff had made a request prior to the hearing date-in conformity with
the regulation. It can also be argued that in Peters the right to confronta-
tion was particularly important, for dismissal for a crime such as accepting
bribes results in a stigma attaching to the discharged individual.
Peters is the result of a reviewing court's strained attempt to conform
the evidence to meet the standards of the substantial-evidence test. This
decision has produced, in effect, a new and less stringent test that treats
hearsay as any other substantive evidence and reduces confrontation to
an even lesser privilege than it has been accorded in the past. Probably
worried about shackling administrative agencies with the bonds of a jury-
trial system of evidence, the Court of Claims retreated into a position based
upon unsound reasoning.
One possible solution is to require direct evidence when the discharge
of government employees or servicemen is in issue before an administrative
agency. This solution would also eliminate most confrontation problems
inherent whenever hearsay evidence forms the basis of a decision. Perhaps
application of a direct-evidence rule to administrative agencies should de-
pend upon the nature of the hearing and the consequences of an adverse
decision against the individual so that hearsay evidence alone would not
be held sufficient to support a decision in a proceeding that is virtually
criminal in nature. Action by Congress is necessary to enact such pro-
cedural safeguards for the accused in administrative hearings; neverthe-
" 28 Fed. Reg. 10089 (1963), in effect when the hearing in Peters took place,
provided: "Both parties are entitled to produce witnesses but as the commission
is not authorized to subpoena witnesses the parties are required to make their
own arrangements for the appearance of witnesses." The current regulation is not
significantly different. See 5 C.F.R. § 772.305(c) (2) (1969). See note 41 supra
for the regulation involved in Williams.
"1 371 U.S. at 532.
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less, if Congress fails to act, it is not improbable that the Supreme Court
may intervene to provide the much-needed protection.
ODEs L. STROUPE, JR.
Civil Procedure-Constitutionality of Constructive Service of Process
on Missing Defendants
With the advent of far-reaching long-arm statutes1 allowing a basis
for in personam jurisdiction with only minimal contacts' in a state, courts
in the future will be faced increasingly with the problem of what manner
of service of process is to be allowed as a sufficient giving of notice to the
defendant. It is only logical that as the geographical-power concept of
jurisdiction diminishes and in personam jurisdiciton can be had over a
greater number of nonresidents,8 courts must give more attention and
primary concern to notice requirements.
The purpose of service of process is to give the defendant notice of
a suit pending against him so that he may come in and defend.4 But what
happens when the plaintiff has a basis for in personam jurisdiction and
the defendant cannot be found so that he can be served with process?
'See N.C. GEN. STAT. §1-75.4 (1969); Wis. STAT. ANN. §262.05 (Supp.
1969). For a thorough discussion of these statutes, see Revision Notes to Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (Supp. 1969); Hinson, Jurisdiction Over Persons and Prop-
erty, in NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION FOUNDATION, INSTITUTE ON JURIS-
DICTION, JOINDER AND PLEADING UNDER NORTH CAROLINA'S NEW RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 1I-I (1968).
" There is extensive judicial development in the area of the minimal-contact
theory. E.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945). See generally Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court JuTris-
diction, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 241; von Mehren & Trautman, JTurisdiction to Adjudi-
cate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966); Developments in the
Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909 (1960).
In all the problematic situations dealt with in this note, it is assumed that the
applicable state long-arm statute has provided the plaintiff with a basis for in
personam jurisdiction. The only question for discussion is whether the plaintiff has
achieved satisfactory service upon the defendant.
'In early American law, jurisdiction and service of process were approached
as two aspects of the same thing. E.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
However, with the modern view of service as notice-giving, the two have become
separate questions. No longer is the manner of notice that is to be given clearly
defined by the type of jurisdiction acquired. No matter what type of jurisdiction is
acquired, plaintiff is required to give defendant the best notice possible. See
Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Walker v. City of Hutchin-
son, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
[Vol. 48
